
"Dekartova metafizika subjektivnosti je,za mene, pre svega reakcija na sholastičke poglede na isti problem (problem položaja subjekta) i logičan zavešetak ideje sistematski zastupane i razvijane u doba humanizma (
Pico dela Mirandola,Vives,G.Bruno i drugi).Zatim su došli "prosvetitelji"(Volter i ostali),pa Kant i Fihte itd.Subjekt u filosofiji postaje sve moćniji i, rekao bih, pretenciozniji.Celu stvar su pomalo (ali bitno)korigovali Levinas,
Fuko i Ž.Derida.Od subjekta se traži da poštuje Drugo(Drugog),marginu diskursa,razliku i - ne treba da bude LOGOCENTRIČAN (egocentričan)
U oblasti psihologije (i na njenim marginama,mislim na
filosofiju)skrenuo bih pažnju u vezi ove teme na radove
Margarete Donaldson i
T.Nejdžela.Evo jednog citata koji govori,čini mi se,o istom (i to daleko bolje od mene):
"Levinas's dispute with modernity is unmistakable,if not always worked out in great detail.Confronted by Kant's moral philosophy, for instance, he objects to the way in which religious transcendence - or what he prefers to call "infinity" - appears only as an "ideal of reason", thus defined in function of human finitude as "a projection of its exigencies in a beyond, the completion of what is given incomplete..."Against this Levinas insists on the revers order of analysis,such that it must be the idea of infinity which defines human finitude,and not the contrary.If is in this line,then,that he defines his ethical subject not by the ideal of autonomy but by the sheer fact of an original and irrecusable heteronomy.The argument in support of this claim is dialectical,appearing first to cede to the position of his opponent,only to reverse it by uncovering a still deeper,opposed phenomenological datum.This movement is plainly evident in 'Totality and Infinity': Levinas approaches human life beginning from a tension observed between the individual relation with the other person which that very self-concern seems to resist or even to exclude.But even as he thus seems to concede that we do indeed relate first to ourselves, he remains a virulent opponent of any claim for the primacy of the individual person,subject,or self.The central claim is well known: before,during,and after anything which I do for myself,there is this other person, whose presence alone therefore gives such acts a meaning which is ethical.Accordingly,it will have been the moral failure of
Western thought to have overlooked or even to have closed itself to that deeper relation,with the result that we its progeny comfortably assume ourselves to be the origin of our acts and the center of our worl."
Jeffrey Bloechl in C.E.Katz "E.Levinas: Beyond Levinas"p.32.